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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
In the ~latter of the Application 
of Case No. 7436 
ROBERT FOLLETTE 
For Writ of Habeas Corpus 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment made and entered 
in favor of the petitioner, Robert Follette, in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 8th day of November, 
1949, wherein the Honorable J. Allen Crockett granted pe-
tioner' s writ of habeas corpus releasing him from the custody 
of Alvin 0. Severson, Warden of the Utah State Prison. 
The petitioner, Robert Follette, had plead guilty to the 
crime of second degree burglary in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about the 17th day of 
August, 1940, (Amended Findings of Fact ~~o. 1), and on 
or about the 24th day of August, 1940, was sentenced to an 
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indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of from one to 
twenty years. (Amended Findings of Fact No. 2). How-
ever, he was granted a stay of execution of said sentence until 
November 21, '1940, and placed in the custody of the Chief 
Agent of the Adult Parole and Probation Department of the 
State of Utah. (Amended Findings of Fact No'. 2). 
On or about the 23rd day of November, 1940, the said 
Robert Follette appeared before the above-entitled court at 
which time he was granted a further stay and ordered to appear 
before the said court on the 15th day .of March, 1941. (Am-
:ended Findings of Fact No. 3). 
. The said Robert Follette failed to appear before the 
above-entitled court on March 15, 1941, as ordered. (Amended 
Findings of Fact No. 6). Furthermore, the Adult Parole 
and Probation Department did not know his whereabouts 
because he had not reported to them since November 4, 1940, 
(Amended Findings of Fact No. 5), even though he had entered 
into an agreement with that department to make monthly 
reports to them concerning his doings and whereabout. (Am-
ended Findings of Fact No. 5). On March 15, 1941, there-
fore, the date when the said Robert Follette was ordered to 
appear before the above-entitled court, the court, upon the 
recommendation of the Adult Parole and Probation Depart-
n1ent entered its order refusing to grant a further stay to the 
said Robert Follette, and, at the same time, entered its order 
_that a commitment issue. Thereupon, on March 17, 1941, 
a commitment did issue. (Amended Findings of Fact No.6). 
Subsequently, and on or about the 7th day of August, 
1949, the said Robert Follette was seized and apprehended in 
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Logan, Utah, (Amended Findings of Fact No.7), and on or 
about the lOth day of August, 1949, (Return to Writ of 
Habeas Corpus), was placed in the Utah State Prison under 
the custody of Alvin 0. Severson, Warden, the appellant in 
this proceeding, pursuant to the order of commitment which 
had been duly issued by the District Court of Salt Lake County 
on March 17, 1941. 
On November 8, 1949, the petitioner, Robert Follette, 
was released from the custody of Alvin 0. Severson, Warden 
of the Utah State Prison, by an order of the Honorable J. 
Allen Crockett, one of the Judges of the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, granting petitioner's writ of 
habeas corpus. It is from the order granting petitioner's wtit 
of habeas corpus that appellant prosecutes this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
the said Robert Follette should have been served with a sum-
mons and/ or citation advising him of the time and place when 
the question of his violation of probation would be considered 
by an agency having authority to make investigation and de-
termination thereof. 
2. The court erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
the said Robert Follette should have had an opportunity to 
secure witnesses by compulsory process and to cross-examine 
such witnesses as might testify to his violation of probation 
in behalf of the state, or to make any defense of his position 
or to make any such explanation as might be necessary. 
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·3. The court erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
the ·deprival of the privileges set forth above in points 1 and 
2 was contrary to the procedural due process guaranteed under 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
4. The court erred in granting the said Robert Follette's 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
ARGUMENT 
In view of the fact that all of the aforesaid points involve 
substantially the same principles of law, they are consolidated 
herein for purpose of argument. 
It is the contention of appellant in this appeal that essen-
tially the only question involved in a habeas corpus proceeding 
is one of jurisdiction; namely, whether the order, judgment or 
proc·ess under attack came within the lawful authority of the 
court or offcer issuing it. In 25 Am. Jur. 159, Habeas Corpus, 
Section 26, it is stated that: 
The primary and, ordinarii y, the only question in-
volved in habeas corpus proceedings is one of juris-
diction-namely, whether the particular order, judg-
ment or process whose validity is attacked is one coming 
within the lawful authority of the court or officer mak-
ing or issuing it. As it may otherwise be stated, in 
the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, the 
scope of inquiry, where restraint is had by virtue of legal 
process, is ordinarily limited to the validty of the process 
on its face and the jurisdiction of the court by which 
it was issued. The writ does not lie to correct errors 
and irregularities committed in the exercise of juris-
diction; but cognizane is taken only of such defects 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
as render absolutely void the proceedings under which 
the petitioner is imprisoned. In short, the writ reaches 
jurisdictional error only; it cannot properly be used to 
serve the mere purpose of an appeal or \vrit of error. 
It will be noted that the record in this case shows, con-
clusively that Robert Follette appeared before the court on 
or about November 23, 1940, at which time he was granted a 
further stay of execution and ordered to appear again before 
the court on March 15, 1941. On the latter date he failed to 
appear and the court thereupon refused to grant a further stay 
of execution and issued an order of commitment pursuant 
to which he was subsequently confined in the Utah State 
Prison. There can be no question, therefore, that on the 
expiration of the stay of execution on March 15, 1941, the 
court had jurisdiction to refuse to grant a further stay of 
execution and thereupon to issue an order of commitment. On 
this jurisdictonal question no hearing was necessary. In 15 
Am. Jur. 147, Criminal Law, Section 496, it is stated that: 
When the execution of a sentence is properly stayed, 
the court does not thereby lose power thereafter to en-
force the sentence. It may enforce it at any subsequent 
time, even after the orginal period of the sentence has 
passed. * * * 
The fact that a defendant who is granted a stay of 
execution for a specified time leaves the jurisdiction of 
the court and remains away until the expiration of his 
term does not prevent the court from enforcing the 
sentence after his return. 
So in this case, the fact that the order of commitn1ent was 
issued on March 17, 1941, and that Robert Follette was not 
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thereafter seized and apprehended until on or about August 
7, 1949, and was thereupon confined in the Utah State Prison 
on or about August 10, 1949, pursuant to that order of com-
mitment, the court was not deprived of its power or jurisdic-
tion to eriforce the sentence previously imposed. See also the 
annotations in 3 A. L. R. 1017 and 97 A. L. R. 811. 
In State vs. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044, 54 A. 
L. R~ 1463, a case decided not on habeas corpus proceedings 
but on appeal from an order of revocation of a suspended 
sentence, it is said: 
A person who has a sentence suspended during good 
behavior, without any limitations, is entitled to a 
hearing upon the question of whether or not he has 
complied with the conditions imposed; that such hear-
ing must be according to some well recognized and 
established rules of judicial procedure; that defendant 
is entitled to have filed either an affidavit, motion, or 
other written pleading, setting forth the facts relied 
upon for a revocation of the suspension of sentence; 
that defendant should be given an opportunity to 
answer or plead to the charge made; that a hearing 
should be had upon the issue joined; and that defendant 
as vv-ell as the state be given the right of cross-exami-
nation. 
While this Honorable Court in subsequent cases dealing with 
the revocation of a suspended sentence reiterated, with certain 
marked limitations, the broad general rule announced in the 
Zolantakis case, supra, it nevertheless criticized the rule therein 
stated, and, by ·inference at least, indicated that it might hold 
otherwise if it presently had to decide a case involving a similar 
set of facts. See Williams vs. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P. 
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(2d) 640; State vs. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P. (2d) 970; and 
Christiansen vs. Harris, 109 Utah 1; 163 P. (2d) 314. It is 
to be noted, too, that in all of the aforesaid cases involving 
the matter of revocation of a suspended sentence, the question 
as to whether or not the terms or conditions upon which the 
suspension of sentence was granted had or had not been vio-
lated, was one upon which reasonable men could honestly 
differ and therefore required a hearing for the determination 
of that very issue. In the present case, however, there was no 
such question. Robert Follette failed to appear before the 
court on March 15, 1941, as he was ordered to do on or about 
November 23, 1940. The court thereupon refused to grant him 
a further stay of execution and entered its order that a com-
mitment issue. Pursuant to that comniitment which was 
issued on March 17, 1941, Robert Follette was subsequently 
committed to the Utah State Prison. Appellant contends 
Robert Follette was rightfully committed. 
It is respectfully submitted that it matters not why Robert 
Follette failed to appear before the court on March 15, 1941. 
His stay expired at that time and the court then had jurisdic-
tion to see that the lawful sentence previously imposed was 
duly executed. In exercising its jurisdiction the court issued 
an order of commitment, and when Robert Follette was finally 
seized and apprehended, he was lawfully committed in the 
Utah ~tate Prison. There was no necessity for a hearing on 
such commitment. 
In Demmick vs. Harris, 106 Utah 32, 144 P. (2d) 761, 
a case involving, as does the present case, the legality of an 
order of commitment issued after the expiration of a stay of 
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execution of a sentence and not uport the revocation of a sus-
pended sentence, this Honorable Court held that: 
The case * * * does not clearly come within the hold-
ing of the Zolantakis case. That case involved a sus-
pension of a sentence during good behavior without any 
limitation as to time. The stay order here was for a 
definite length of time. It was not revoked-it ex-
. pired. Upon its expiraton the defendant was com-
mitted in accordance with the judgment and sentence 
previously imposed. The petitioner has failed to carry 
his burden of proving that he was unlawfully com-
mitted. 
Even if it be assumed in the present case, for the purpose of 
argument, that Robert Follette was given a stay to a day certain 
with an implied promise that if he complied with the terms 
and conditions imposed he would be granted a further stay, he 
failed to comply with the court's order requiring him to appear 
before it on March 15, 1941, to determine whether or not 
a further stay should be granted. As to his failure to comply 
with the court's order to appear before it on March 15, 1941, 
there could be no difference of opinion. Under such circum-
stances, certainly the court was not bound to and should not 
have granted him a further stay. Its only alternative was to 
issue an order of commitment, which was done. 
Finally, in McCoy vs. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P. (2d) 
721, which involved the revocation of a parole, this Honorable 
Court held that a parole was merely the granting of a condi-
tional privilege which could be revoked at any time without 
the necessity of a hearing. In the course of the opinion it 
was stated: 
10 
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Both logic and authority impels the holding under 
our statutes and system that a parolee is not entitled 
as of right to notice and hearing before revocation of 
a parole. 
Certainly it cannot be successfully argued that a person ordered 
to appear before the court at the expiration of the stay of 
execution of his sentence who fails to do so is entitled to greater 
rights and privileges than a parolee whose parole may be re-
voked at any time without the necessity of a hearing. Nor can 
it be successfully argued that at such time the court has lost 
jurisdiction to carry out the sentence previously imposed. 
In Ex Parte Sichofsky, D.C. Cal., 273 F. 694, affirmed C.C.A., 
·Sichofsky vs. U. S., 277 F. 762, a habeas corpus proceeding, 
it was contended that the District Court lost all its jursdiction 
by granting several stays of execution and by permitting the 
petitioner to be tried in the state court for the crime of grand 
larceny. The court said however: 
I discover nothing, however, based either upon 
reason or authority, from which t may now be adjudged 
that the action of this court, in temporarily staying the 
execution of the judgment of this court, served to 
divest this court of jurisdiction to require petitioner 
to stand for judgment as per the admitted violation of 
the federal law. It would be a strange and bold asser-
tion, in my judgment, for this court, possessing the 
amplest jurisdiction as above referred to, to hold that 
it had completely divested itself of all jurisdiction in 
the premises merely by an order staying execution. 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant contends that on March 15, 1941, the District 
Court of Salt Lake County did have jurisdiction to issue an 
order of commitment for Robert Follette in executing the 
sentence previously imposed upon him, and that the subsequent 
commitment of Robert Follette pursuant to that order was 
proper and lawful. Where, as was the fact in this case, a 
person is sentenced to a prison term but is granted a stay to 
a day certain and ordered to appear before the court to deter-
mine whether or not a further stay should be granted, but 
fails to appear on the specified date, for whatever reason and 
without having been previously excused, a fact concerning 
which reasonable men may not honestly differ, he is not en-
titled to a hearing on the question as to whether or not a com-
mitment should issue. Furthermore, an order of commitment 
issued under such circumstances is lawful and does not violate 
the procedural due process guaranteed by Article 1, Section 7 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
The court in effect is merely exercising its jurisdiction in 
carrying out the exe~ution of the sentence previously imposed 
in accordance with the due process requirements of the Con-
stitution. To hold that on a stay date a court cannot issue an 
order of commitment to carry out a lawful sentence previously 
imposed, unless and until the defendant is before the court, 
would be to vest the defendant with power to deprive the 
court of jurisdiction by wrongfully refusing to appear before 
it, as ordered, at the expiration of his stay. Certainly the law 
does not contemplate such an absurdity. 
In conclusion appellant respectfully submits that the 
12 
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District Court erred in releasing Robert Follette from the cus-
tody of the Warden of the Utah State Prison and that itsorder 
of November 8, 1949, granting Robert Follette's petition for 
writ of habeas corpus should therefore be reversed by this 
Honorable Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON 
Assistant Attorney Genetal 
ATJ"ORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
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